Dressed in light green camouflage fatigues, the soft-spoken Gun Maw and his comrades chatted in the Kachin language, occasionally breaking into laughter. Behind them was a makeshift pavilion, constructed to hold the first direct talks between representatives of the Burmese military and the KIA since clashes broke out between the two sides on June 9. Nearby were plastic bags containing Johnny Walker whiskey— gifts for the Burmese delegation.
At 11:00 a.m., Col Than Aung, the Kachin State minister for border affairs, arrived at the pavilion with his entourage. He indicated from the start of the meeting that he was directly representing the national government in Naypyidaw, not just the Kachin State government, by saying that, “Higher authorities and I talked over this conflict. You understand who I am referring to, don’t you?”
In what seemed to be an overture, he said that the KIA’s liaison offices should be reopened so the KIA and the Burmese government could work together—the KIA set up the offices in Kachin State’s urban areas after the 1994 ceasefire was signed, but the Burmese government forced them to close late last year after the ethnic armed group rejected Naypyidaw’s order to transform itself into a member of the government’s border guard force (BGF) under the command of the Burmese army.
Than Aung also asked Gun Maw for a signed acknowledgement that the KIA would renew the ceasefire, and asked the KIA officials to participate in the country’s political process “in dignity.”
These requests came despite the fact that Than Aung did not himself carry any official document saying that the government would renew the ceasefire, and the fact that the Burmese military regime—which in March was replaced by a nominally civilian government—forbid three Kachin political parties from participating in the parliamentary elections last November on grounds that their leaders were linked to the KIA.
When Gun Maw asked Than Aung for formal evidence that the Burmese army would end hostile attacks against the KIA, Than Aung did not answer directly, saying he will have to report to the “higher authorities.”
“We heard that the Burmese army was reinforcing its troops in Kachin State, some of which have arrived by ship,” Gun Maw said.
“No, that’s not true,” Than Aung replied. “All are at normal levels. This is the media age. We cannot hide anything.”
Although Gun Maw and the other KIA officials at the meeting expressed a desire for a ceasefire, they indicated that any agreement to halt fighting must come with tangible political reforms and compromise from the Naypyidaw government. In particular, he told the Burmese delegation that the government must change the “Nargis Law,” referring to the current Constitution, which was voted on in a referendum held in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
“A ceasefire does not necessarily mean peace,” Gun Maw said. “Many describe the previous ceasefire as peace, which it really wasn’t.”
During the previous ceasefire, the KIA and its political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), asked the Burmese regime to engage in regional development and provide a political solution to the decades old conflict which granted autonomy to the Kachin people in Kachin State. At that time, the Burmese military generals said they did not have the mandate to solve the political questions, which could only be addressed after a civilian government came into power.
Between the time the 1994 ceasefire was entered into and 2009, when the KIA first rejected the BGF plan, Chinese companies and Burmese business groups with links to the government invested in a number of large projects in Kachin State, such as hydropower projects, that benefitted the outside investors but not local people and came with significant negative social and environmental impacts.
In addition, during that time the KIA focused its efforts on regional development and stopped actively recruiting and training new forces for its armed militia, which weakened its position in relation to the Burmese government. So when the KIA complained to the Burmese government about the unfairness and negative effects of projects such as the Chinese-built Myitsone Dam, it lacked the negotiating leverage either to halt the project or change the terms.